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Abstract Szpilrajn’s Lemma entails that each partial order extends to a lin-
ear order. Dushnik and Miller use Szpilrajn’s Lemma to show that each partial
order has a relizer. Since then, many authors utilize Szpilrajn’s Theorem and
the Well-ordering principle to prove more general existence type theorems on
extending binary relations. Nevertheless, we are often interested not only in
the existence of extensions of a binary relation R satisfying certain axioms of
orderability, but in something more: (A) The conditions of the sets of alter-
natives and the properties which R satisfies to be inherited when one passes
to any member of a subfamily of the family of extensions of R and: (B) The
size of a family of ordering extensions of R, whose intersection is R, to be the
smallest one. The key to addressing these kinds of problems is the szpilrajn in-
herited method. In this paper, we define the notion of Λ(m)-consistency, where
m can reach the first infinite ordinal ω, and we give two general inherited type
theorems on extending binary relations, a Szpilrajn type and a Dushnik-Miller
type theorem, which generalize all the well known existence and inherited type
extension theorems in the literature.
Keywords Consistent binary relations, Extension theorems, Intersection of
binary relations.
JEL Classification C60, D00, D60, D71.
1 Introduction
One of the most fundamental results on extensions of binary relations is the
following theorem proved by E. Szpilrajn in 1930 [30].
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Theorem 1 Let ≤ be a partial order on a set X and let x and y be two
incomparable elements of X (neither x ≤ y nor y ≤ x). Then, there exists
a linear order ≤∗ on X which contains all pairs of ≤ and all pairs (κ, λ) for
which κ ≤ y and x ≤ λ holds.
The original proof of the theorem splits into two steps: In the first step, if
x and y are two incomparable elements of X , then it is constructed a partial
order ≤′ such that every element of A = {κ ∈ X |κ ≤ y} must lie below, with
respect to ≤′, to every element of B = {λ ∈ X |x ≤ λ}. So we take ≤′′=≤
∪ ≤′=≤ ∪(A × B), in other words, we include these obvious consequences of
putting y below x and no others. Clearly, R′ is transitive. In the second step,
we see that if ⊑ is a maximal element (under inclusion) in the set of partial
orders extending ≤′, then, ⊑ must be a total order. Because otherwise, if x
and y are incomparable in ⊑, then, by the first step, we have an extension
⊑′ of ⊑ such that y ⊑′ x, a contradiction to the maximality of ⊑. (We have
first to show that the union of a chain of posets is a poset. This is a standard
Zorn’s Lemma argument.)
The crucial point in the original proof of Szpilrajn’s Theorem is the rela-
tionship of the pair (x, y) with the pairs (κ, λ) ∈ A × B which concludes the
transitive axiom for the relation ≤′. In fact: (α) For every linear extension
⊑ of ≤, y ⊑ x implies κ ⊑ λ and: (β) x <′ λ implies y <′ λ and κ <′ y
implies κ <′ x. In case (α), we say that (y, x) covers (κ, λ) and in case (β),
we say that (y, x) ia an uncovered pair of ≤′ (see [23, Lemma 5]). The true
meaning of the Szpilrajn theorem is that, although it is not constructive, it
preserves prescribed properties in the extended relation. In fact, by extending
a binary relation R, it is interesting to see whether the conditions of the un-
derlying space X or the properties which R satisfies should be inherited when
one passes to any member of some family of linear extensions of R. More-
over, in extending a binary relation relation R, the problem will often be how
to incorporate some additional data depending on the binary relation with a
minimum of disruption of the existing structure or how to extend the relation
so that some desirable new condition is fulfilled. For example, as shows case
(β) above, if we might wish to adjoin the pair (x, y) to a transitive relation
R that does not already relates x and y, in order to preserve the relation R
the axiom of transitivity, we must also adjoin all other pairs of the form (κ, λ)
where (κ, y) ∈ R and (x, λ) ∈ R. Generally speaking, a natural question in a
extension process is to ask, when a given binary relation R defined on a set of
alternatives X will preserve the properties and the characteristics of X , or of
R. For instance, if we refer to a property (P ) of R, the answer is affirmative if
(P) is the property that the chains generated by R are well-ordered (see [4]) or
if (P) is the property that x∗ ∈ X is a maximal element of R (see Proposition
4 below). Addressing a slightly different question, we might wish to find con-
ditions under which the properties which R or X satisfies to be inherited when
one passes to a linear extension of R. For example, Fucks [15, Corollary 13]
finds conditions under which homogeneous partial orders can be extended to
homogeneous linear orders. Kontolatou and Stabakis [21] give an analogue of
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the Szpilrajn Lemma for partially ordered abelian groups. On the other hand,
many other papers in the literature deal with the characterization of the set of
binary relations which have an ordering extension that satisfies some additional
conditions. See, among others, Demuynck [8] for the additional conditions of
convexity, monotonicity and homotheticity and Demuynck and Lauwers [9]
for the condition of linearity. If X is endowed with some topology τ one is
mainly interested in continuous or semicontinuous linear orders or preorders
instead of only linear orders or preorders. In this case, two natural problems
have to be discussed: (a) Let R be a continuous binary relation defined on
a topological space (X, τ). Determine necessary and sufficient conditions for
R to have a continuous linear order extension; (b) Determine necessary and
sufficient conditions for τ on X to have the Szpilrajn property (every contin-
uous binary relation R on X has a continuous linear order extension). In this
direction, some authors utilize the method of Szpilrajn to find the conditions
under which τ is preserved in the extended relation. For example, Jaffray [20]
and Bossert, Sprumont, and Suzumura [5] provide conditions for the existence
of upper semicontinuous extensions of strict (or weak) orders and consistent
binary relations, respectively and Herden and Pallack [18] provide conditions
for the existence of continuous extensions.
In conclusion, there are many types of conditions that one may wish to
preserve, or to achieve, in an extension process. These include:
(i) Order theoretic conditions (consistency, acyclicity, transitivity, com-
pleteness, e.t.c.);
(ii) Topological conditions (continuity, openness or closedness of the pref-
erence sets);
(iii) linear-space conditions (convexity, homogeneity, translation-inva-
riance).
In the following, we call as inherited type extensions theorems, all these
theorems that preserve, or achieve in an extension process the properties of
the original space. The main feature of these theorems, is that they don’t use
in their proof the Szpilrajn’s Theorem.
On the other hand, many authors give generalizations of the Szpilrajn’s
result by utilizing the original theorem. In what follows, we refer to such results
as existence type extension theorems. Arrow [1, page 64], Hansson [17] and
Fishburn [14] prove on the basis of the original Szpilrajn’s extension theorem
that the result remains true if asymmetry is replaced with reflexivity, that
is, any quasi-ordering has an ordering extension. While the property of being
a quasi-ordering is sufficient for the existence of an ordering extension of a
relation, this is not necessary. As shown by Suzumura [29], consistency, as it
is defined by him, is necessary and sufficient for the existence of an ordering
extension. The existence type extension theorems have played an important
role in the theory of choice. One way of assessing whether a preference relation
is rational1 is to check whether it can be extended to a transitive and complete
1 It is well known that the economic approach to rational behaviour traditionally begins
with a preference relation R and determines the optimal choice function F from R. Revealed
4 Athanasios Andrikopoulos
relation (see [7] and [24]2). In addition, the Szpilrajn’s existence type theorems
are applied: (i) By Stehr [27] to characterize the global orientability; (ii) By
Sholomov [26] to characterize ordinal relations; (iii) By Nehring and Puppe [22]
on a unifying structure of abstract choice theory; (iv) By Blackorby, Bossert
and Donaldson [3] in pure population problems e.t.c.
Dushnik and Miller [13] use the Szpilrajn’s Theorem to prove the following
result:
Theorem 2 Let≤ be a partial order on a setX . Then, there exists a collection
of linear extensions F of R such that: (α) The intersection of the members
of F coincides with ≤ and: (β) for every pair of elements x, y ∈ X with x
incomparable to y, there exists an Q ∈ F with (x, y) ∈ Q.
A family F of linear extensions of R which satisfies conditions (α) and
(β) is called a realizer of R. By the theorem of Szpilrajn, for every pair (x, y)
of incomparable elements of R we choose two linear extensions ≤xy and ≤yx
for which there holds x ≤xy y and y ≤yx x. Then, the intersection of all
linear orderings ≤xy and ≤yx, where (x, y) runs through the set of all pairs of
incomparable elements of R is the relation ≤. But, this set of linear extensions,
has many more elements than necessary. As a consequence of what we have said
above, by using the notion of uncovered pair, one can obtain a partial order ≤
with the intersection of a reduced number of its linear order extensions. The
concept of a realizer F ofR leads to the definition of dimension of ≤. According
to Dushnik and Miller, the dimension of a partial order ≤ is defined as the
minimum size of a realizer of ≤. In fact, the Dushnik-Miller’s theorem provides
a procedure that represent binary relations as an intersection of a number of
linear order extensions equal to its dimension. In what follows, given a binary
relation R, a Dushnik-Miller existence type extension theoremmeans that there
exists a collection of linear extensions F of R whose intersection is R and a
Dushnik-Miller inherited type extension theorem means that R has a realizer.
Much of economic and social behavior observed is either group behavior or
that of an individual acting for a group. Group preferences may be regarded as
derived from individual preferences, by means of some process of aggregation.
For example, if all voters agree that some alternative x is preferred to another
alternative y, then the majority rule will return this ranking. In this case, there
is one simple condition that is nearly always assumed called the principle of
unanimity3 or Pareto principle. This declares that the preference relation for
a group of individuals should include the intersection of their individual pref-
erences. Another example of the use of intersections is in the description of
preference theory provides another axiomatic approach to rational behavior by reversing the
above procedure.
2 In particular Szpilrajn theorem is the main tool for proving a known theorem of Richter
that establishes the equivalence between rational and congruous consumers.
3 Let (R1, R2, ...,Rn) be a fixed profile of the individual preference relations. A binary
relation Q, is called Pareto unanimity relation, if
xQy⇔ xRiy for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and all x, y ∈ X.
If R1, R2, ...,Rn are transitive then Q is quasi-transitive.
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simple games which can be represented as the intersection of weighted ma-
jority games [16]. Dushnik-Miller existence type theorems have been given by
many authors. For example, the sufficient part of Suzumuras’s extension re-
sult, was subsequently used by Donaldson and Weymark [11] in their proof
that every quasi-ordering is the intersection of a collection of orderings; this
result extends Dushnik and Miller’s fundamental observation on intersections
of strict linear orders. Duggan [12] proves a general Dushnik-Miller existence
type theorem from which the above results -and several new ones- can be ob-
tained as special cases. On the existence of a social welfare ordering for a fixed
profile in the sense of Bergson and Samuelson, Weymark [31] applies Dushnik
and Miller extension theorem in order to prove a generalization of Moulin’s
Pareto extension theorem.
In this paper, we introduce the notion of Λ(m)-consistency, where m be-
longs to the set of all ordinals less than or equal to the first infinite ordinal
ω and we characterize: (a) The existence of a general inherited type theorem
on extending binary relations and: (b) The existence of a realizer for a bi-
nary relation. The results of the two given general inherited type theorems
on extending binary relations, namely, the Szpilrajn type extension theorem
and the Dushnik-Miller type extension theorem, generalize all the well known
existence and inherited type extension theorems in the literature. We also give
examples in a general context to highlight the importance of the inherited
type extension theorems and to illustrate its difference from the notion of the
existence type extension theorems.
2 Notations and definitions
Let X be a non-empty universal set of alternatives, and let R ⊆ X × X
be a binary relation on X . We sometimes abbreviate (x, y) ∈ R as xRy. The
composition of two binary relationsR1 and R2 is given by R1◦R2 where (x, y) ∈
R1 ◦R2 if and only if there exists z ∈ X such that (x, z) ∈ R1 and (z, y) ∈ R2.
A binary relation R can always be composed with itself, that is R ◦ R = R2.
This can be generalized to a relation Rm on X where Rm = R ◦R ◦ ... ◦R (m-
times). Let P (R) and I(R) denote, respectively, the asymmetric part of R and
the symmetric part of R, which are defined, respectively, by P (R) = {(x, y) ∈
X × X |(x, y) ∈ R and (y, x) /∈ R} and I(R) = {(x, y) ∈ X × X |(x, y) ∈ R
and (y, x) ∈ R}. Let also ∆ = {(x, x)|x ∈ X} denotes the diagonal ox X . An
element x ∈ X is called maximal if for all y ∈ X , yRx implies xRy. We say
that R on X is (i) reflexive if for each x ∈ X (x, x) ∈ R; (ii) irreflexive if
we never have (x, x) ∈ R; (iii) transitive if for all x, y, z ∈ X , [(x, z) ∈ R and
(z, y) ∈ R] =⇒ (x, y) ∈ R; (iv) antisymmetric if for each x, y ∈ X , [(x, y) ∈ R
and (y, x) ∈ R] =⇒ x = y; (v) total if for each x, y ∈ X , x 6= y we have
xRy or yRx. (vi) complete if for each x, y ∈ X , we have xRy or yRx. It
follows that R is complete if and only if it is reflexive and total. The transitive
closure of a relation R is denoted by R, that is for all x, y ∈ X, (x, y) ∈ R
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if there exist m ∈ N and z
0
, ..., z
m
∈ X such that x = z
0
, (z
k
, z
k+1
) ∈ R for
all k ∈ {0, ...,m − 1} and z
m
= y. Clearly, R is transitive and, because the
case m = 1 is included, it follows that R ⊆ R. Acyclicity says that there do
not exist m and z
0
, z
1
, ..., z
m
∈ X such that x = z
0
, (z
k
, z
k+1
) ∈ R for all
k ∈ {0, ...,m − 1} and z
m
= x. The relation R is S-consistent (consistent
in the sense of Suzumura [29]), if for all x, y ∈ X, for all m ∈ N, and for
all z
0
, z
1
, ..., z
m
∈ X , if x = z
0
, (z
k
, z
k+1
) ∈ R for all k ∈ {0, ...,m − 1} and
z
m
= y, we have that (y, x) /∈ P (R). The following combination of properties
are considered in the next theorems. A binary relation R on X is (i) quasi-
ordering if R is reflexive and transitive; (ii) ordering if R is a total quasi-
ordering; (iii) partial order if R is an antisymmetric quasi-ordering; (iv) linear
order if R is a total partial order; (v) strict partial order if R is irreflexive and
transitive. (vi) strict linear order if R is a total strict partial order. A binary
relation Q is an extension of a binary relation R if and only if R ⊆ Q and
P (R) ⊆ P (Q). If an extension Q of R is an ordering, we call it an ordering
extension of R, and if Q is an extension of R that is a linear order, we refer to
it as a linear order extension or R. In fact, an extension Q of R subsumes all
the pairwise information provided by R, and possibly further information.
The following definitions may be seen as natural extensions of classical
definitions used in the partial order case. Let inc(R) = {(x, y) ∈ X×X |(x, y) /∈
R and (y, x) /∈ R} be the set of incomparable pairs of R. The set of all of the
linear extensions of R is denoted by Q. For (x, y) and (κ, λ) ∈ inc(R) we write
((x, y), (κ, λ)) ∈ F - in words (x, y) covers (κ, λ)- if for every linear extension
Q of R, (x, y) ∈ Q implies (κ, λ) ∈ Q. We call a maximal element (x∗, y∗) of
(inc(R), F ), i.e., (x∗, y∗) in M(inc(R), F ), an uncovered pair of R. By F(x,y)
we denote the set {(κ, λ) ∈ inc(R)|((x, y), (κ, λ)) ∈ F}. Any subset F ⊆ Q is a
realizer of R if and only if: (α¯) The intersection of the members of F coincides
with R and: (β¯) for every pair (x, y) ∈ inc(R), x, y ∈ X , there exists an Q ∈ F
with (x, y) ∈ Q. The dimension of a binary relation R (see [13, Page 601]) is
the smallest number of linear orderings whose intersection is R.
Let R be a binary relation defined on a topological space (X, τ). We say
that R is continuous, if it is a closed subset of X×X . This is the same thing as
saying that for every point x ∈ X , both sets {y ∈ X |xRy} and {y ∈ X |yRx}
are closed subsets of X (see [25, Proposition 1]). We say that R is upper
semicontinuous if for all y ∈ X , the set {x ∈ X |(x, y) ∈ P (R)} is open in X .
In general, there is no relationship between a binary relation and a topology
on a space. However, there is one topology that is inherently connected with
a total order R, called the order topology, which is generated by the subbase
consisting of all sets of the form {x ∈ X |xP (R)a} and {x ∈ X |bP (R)x}, where
a and b are points of X . The space (X, τ) )is compact if for each collection of
τ -open sets which cover X there exists a finite subcollection that also covers
X .
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3 The extension theorems
In the context of examining if the individualistic assumptions used in eco-
nomics can be used in the aggregation of individual preferences ([1, Definition
5, Theorem 2], Arrow proved a key lemma that extends the famous Szpilrajn’s
Theorem.
Arrow’s lemma.[1, pp. 64-68]. Let R be a quasi-ordering on X , Y a subset
of X such that, if x 6= y and x, y ∈ Y , then (x, y) /∈ R, and T an ordering on
Y . Then, there exists an ordering extension Q such that Q/Y = T .
In fact, the lemma says that, if R is a binary relation defined on a set of
alternatives X , then given any ordering T to any subset Y of incomparable
elements of R, there is a way of ordering all the alternatives which will be
compatible both with R and with the given ordering T in Y . In this case, it
is important that the linear extension of R inherits the relationship we put
between the incomparable elements of R.
Arrow’s generalization of the Szpilrajn’s extension theorem as well as all
the well known generalizations of this theorem, use in their proof the Szpilrajn
theorem itself. This procedure lead us in existence type extension theorems.
In the following ω denotes the first infinite ordinal which comes after all
natural numbers, that is, the order type of the natural numbers under their
usual linear ordering. By Ω
0
we denote the set {ω, 1, 2, 3, ......}.
A great deal of work in computational economics and Computational social
science has been done in an attempt to find a fast algorithm to count the exact
number of linear extensions of a partial order, as well as, to find an efficient
algorithm to compute the dimension of a partial order. In this direction, we give
two general inherited type extension theorems, by reducing the path length of
the transitive closure in the definition of S-consistency to a minimum, without
losing information. To be more precise, we give the following definition.
Definition 1 Let R be a binary relation on a set X , let m ∈ Ω
0
and let
x, y ∈ X . We say that: (i) R is m-consistent, if for all x, y ∈ X and for all
z
0
, z
1
, ..., z
m
∈ X , if x = z
0
, (z
k
, z
k+1
) ∈ R for all k ∈ {0, ...,m − 1} and
z
m
= y, we have that (y, x) /∈ P (R); (ii) R has the m-rank of symmetry if for
each n ≥ m we have I(Rn) = I(Rm); (iii) R is Λ(m)-consistent if m is the
largest natural satisfying m-consistency and m-rank of symmetry.
Remark 1 If R is Λ(m)-consistent, then it is m′-consistent for all 1 ≤ m′ ≤ m.
Therefore, if there exist x, g
0
, g
1
, ..., g
m′
∈ X such that x = g
0
, (g
k
, g
k+1
) ∈ R
for all k ∈ {0, ...,m′ − 1}, and g
m′
= x, then we have that (g
k
, g
k+1
) ∈ I(R).
The following proposition is evident from Definition 1(i).
Proposition 1 Let X be a non empty set and let m ∈ Ω
0
. A binary relation
R on X is m-consistent if and only if P (R) ⊆ P (Rm).
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If m = ω, then Rω =
∞⋃
k=1
Rk = R. Since I(Rω) = I(R) = I(Rω
′
) holds
for all ordinals ω′ ≥ ω, Definition 1 and Proposition 1 imply the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 A binary relation R is Λ(ω)-consistent if and only if R is
S-consistent.
As shows in the following example, an m-consistent binary relation is not
an S-consistent one.
Example 1 Let X = {x
1
, x
2
, x
3
, x
4
, x
5
} and
G = {(x
1
, x
2
), (x
2
, x
3
), (x
3
, x
4
), (x
4
, x
3
), (x
4
, x
1
), (x
2
, x
5
)}.
Clearly, G is a 2-consistent binary relation but not an S-consistent one.
Theorem 3 Let R be a binary relation on X , m ∈ Ω
0
and Y a subset of X
such that, if x 6= y and x, y ∈ Y , then (x, y) /∈ R, and T an ordering on Y .
Then, there exists an ordering extension Q of R such that Q/Y = T if and
only if R is a Λ(m)-consistent binary relation.
Proof To prove necessity, let R be a Λ(m)-consistent binary relation on X .
Without loss of generality, we can assume that R is reflexive (see [30, Lemma,
Page 387]). We put
R∗ = R ∪ {(κ, λ)|κRy and xRλ,where x, y ∈ Y and (y, x) ∈ T } = R ∪ R̂.
Since R is reflexive, we have (y, x) ∈ R̂ and x 6= y for all x, y ∈ Y . It is easy
to check that
(R∗)m = Rm∪{(κ, λ)|κRy and xRλ,where x, y ∈ Y and (y, x) ∈ T } = Rm∪R̂.
By the definition of R∗, we have κ 6= λ, because otherwise (x, y) ∈ R ◦R = R,
a contradiction. We first prove that R∗ R∗ is Λ(m)-consistent. Indeed, suppose
to the contrary that there are alternatives ν, z
0
, z
1
, z
2
, ..., z
m
∈ X such that
ν = z
0
P (R ∪ R̂)z
1
(R ∪ R̂)z
2
...(R ∪ R̂)z
m
= ν.
Since R is Λ(m)-consistent, there must exists k = 0, 1, 2, ...,m− 1 such that
(z
k
, z
k+1
) ∈ R̂ and for all i ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...,m − 1} with i 6= k, (z
i
, z
i+1
) ∈ R∗
if and only if (z
i
, z
i+1
) ∈ R. It follows that (x, y) ∈ R, a contradiction. It
remains to prove that for each n ≥ m there holds I((R∗)n) = I((R∗)m). Let
κ, λ ∈ X and n ∈ N be such that (κ, λ) ∈ I((R∗)n). Then, we have four cases
to consider:
Case 1. (κ, λ) ∈ Rn and (λ, κ) ∈ Rn. It follows that (κ, λ) ∈ I(Rm) ⊆
I((R∗)m).
Case 2. (κ, λ) ∈ Rn, (λ, κ) ∈ R̂. It follows that (κ, λ) ∈ Rm, (x, κ) ∈ R and
(λ, y) ∈ R. Therefore, (x, y) ∈ R which is impossible.
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Case 3. It is similar to case 2.
Case 4. In this case we have (κ, y) ∈ R, (x, λ) ∈ R, (λ, y) ∈ R and (x, κ) ∈ R.
It follows that (x, y) ∈ R which is impossible. Therefore, I((R∗)n) = I(Rn) =
I(Rm) ⊆ I((R∗)m). The last conclusion shows that R∗ is a Λ(m)-consistent
binary relation on X satisfying R ∪ T ⊆ R∗. We now prove that R∗ is an
extension of R, that is, R ⊆ R∗ and P (R) ⊆ P (R∗). The first is obvious from
the definition of R∗. To prove the second, let (κ, λ) ∈ P (R). Then, (κ, λ) ∈
P (R) ⊆ R ⊆ R∗. Suppose to the contrary that (κ, λ) /∈ P (R∗). It follows that
(λ, κ) ∈ R∗. We have two cases to consider: (α) (λ, κ) ∈ R; (β) λRy and xRκ.
In case (i), we have a contradiction to (κ, λ) ∈ P (R). In case (ii), λRy and xRκ
jointly to and (κ, λ) ∈ P (R) implies that (x, y) ∈ R ◦ P (R) ◦ R ⊆ R which
is impossible. The last contradiction shows that (κ, λ) ∈ P (R∗) which implies
that P (R) ⊆ P (R∗).
Suppose that R˜ = {R˜i|i ∈ I} denote the set of Λ(m)-consistent extensions
of R such that R∪T ⊆ R˜i. Since R∗ ∈ R˜ we have that R˜ 6= ∅. Let Q = (Qi)i∈I
be a chain in R˜, and let Q̂ =
⋃
i∈I
Q
i
. We prove that Q̂ ∈ R˜. Clearly, R∪T ⊆ Q̂.
To prove that Q̂ is a Λ(m)-consistent extension of R, we first show that Q̂
is m-consistent. Indeed, suppose to the contrary that there are alternatives
µ, γ
0
, γ
1
, γ
2
, ..., γ
m
∈ X such that
µ = γ
0
P (Q̂)γ
1
Q̂γ
2
...Q̂γ
m
Q̂γ
m
= µ.
Consider the largest i for which there exist such µ, γ
0
, γ
1
, γ
2
, ..., γ
m+1
. It follows
that Q
i
is non m-consistent, a contradiction. Therefore, Q̂ is m-consistent.
On the other hand, if n ≥ m, then I(Qni ) = I(Q
m
i ) for all i ∈ I implies
that I((
⋃
i∈I
Qi)
n) = I((
⋃
i∈I
Qi)
m). Indeed, let κ, λ ∈ X such that (κ, λ) ∈
I((
⋃
i∈I
Q
i
)n) and (κ, λ) /∈ I((
⋃
i∈I
Q
i
)m). Since (Q
i
)
i∈I
is a chain, there exists
i∗ ∈ I such that (κ, λ) ∈ I(Qn
i∗
) and (κ, λ) /∈ I(Qm
i∗
), a contradiction to
I(Qn
i∗
) = I(Qm
i∗
). The last conclusion shows that Q̂ is Λ(m)-consistent. We
now prove that P (R) ⊆ P (Q̂). Take any (κ, λ) ∈ P (R) and suppose to the
contrary that (κ, λ) /∈ P (Q̂). Clearly, κ 6= λ and for each i ∈ I, (κ, λ) ∈ Q
i
.
Since (κ, λ) /∈ P (
⋃
i∈I
Q
i
) we conclude that (λ, κ) ∈
⋃
i∈I
Q
i
. Hence, (λ, κ) ∈ Q
i
∗
for some i∗ ∈ I, a contradiction to (κ, λ) ∈ P (R) ⊆ P (Q
i
∗ ). Therefore, Q̂ is
a Λ(m)-consistent extension of R such that R ∪ T ⊆ Q̂. By Zorn’s lemma R˜
possesses an element, say Q, that is maximal with respect to set inclusion.
We prove that Q is a ordering extension of R satisfying the requirements of
theorem. Since Q is reflexive and transitive, it remains to prove that: (α̂) Q
is total and (β̂) P (Q) ⊆ P (Q). To prove (α̂), take any x, y ∈ X such that
(x, y) /∈ Q and (y, x) /∈ Q. Then, we have two subcases to consider: (α̂
1
)
x, y ∈ Y ; (α̂
2
) x /∈ Y or y /∈ Y . In subcase (α̂
1
) we have (x, y) /∈ T . By the
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completeness of T we conclude that (y, x) ∈ T ⊆ Q ⊆ Q, a contradiction. In
subcase (α̂
2
), if (x, y) /∈ Q and (y, x) /∈ Q, we define
Q∗ = Q ∪ {(κ, λ)|κQy and xQλ}.
Then, as in the case of R∗ above, where Y ∗ = {x, y} and T ∗ = {(y, x)} play
the role of Y and T respectively, we conclude that Q∗ is a Λ(m)-consistent
extension of R, a contradiction to the maximality of Q. The last contradic-
tion shows that Q is complete (total and reflexive). To prove (β), we first
prove that Q = Qm
⋃
(
∞⋃
p=m+1
P (Qp)). Clearly, Qm
⋃
(
∞⋃
p=m+1
P (Qp)) ⊆ Q.
To prove the converse, suppose to the contrary that (κ, λ) ∈ Q and (κ, λ) /∈
Qm
⋃
(
∞⋃
p=m+1
P (Qp)). Since (κ, λ) ∈ Q \ Qm, there exists ρ > m such that
(κ, λ) ∈ Qρ. On the other hand, (κ, λ) /∈
∞⋃
p=m+1
P (Qp) implies that (κ, λ) ∈
I(Qρ). By m-rank equivalence we have I(Qρ) = I(Qm), a contradiction to
(κ, λ) /∈ Qm. Therefore, Q = Qm
⋃
(
∞⋃
p=m+1
P (Qp)). To prove that P (Q) ⊆
P (Q), suppose to the contrary that (κ, λ) ∈ P (Q) ⊆ P (Qm) and (κ, λ) /∈
P (Q). It follows that (λ, κ) ∈ Qm
⋃
(
∞⋃
p=m+1
P (Qp)). Since (κ, λ) ∈ P (Qm) we
conclude that (λ, κ) ∈
∞⋃
p=m+1
P (Qp). It follows that (κ, λ) ∈ I(Qq) for some
q > m. But then, (κ, λ) ∈ I(Qq) = I(Qm), a contradiction to (λ, κ) /∈ Qm.
Therefore, P (Q) ⊆ P (Q). To complete the sufficiency part we show that
Q/Y = T . Evidently, T ⊆ Q/Y . To prove the converse, let (κ, λ) ∈ Q/Y .
Suppose to the contrary that (κ, λ) /∈ T . Since T is complete (λ, κ) ∈ T holds
which implies (λ, κ) ∈ R∗. On the other hand, (κ, λ) /∈ T and (κ, λ) /∈ Q ⊇ R
(κ, λ ∈ Y ) imply that (κ, λ) /∈ R∗. Since Q is an ordering extension of R∗, we
have that (λ, κ) ∈ P (R∗) ⊆ P (Q) ⊆ P (Q). It follows that (κ, λ) /∈ Q/Y , a
contradiction. The last contradiction shows that Q/Y = T .
In order to prove sufficiency, let us assume that R has an ordering extension
Q satisfying the requirements of the theorem. Then, R is S-consistent and thus
Λ(ω)-consistent. Indeed, suppose to the contrary that there are alternatives
τ, pi
0
, pi
1
, pi
2
, ..., pi
σ
∈ X such that
τ = pi
0
P (R)pi
1
Rpi
2
R...Rpi
σ
Rpi
0
= τ.
Since Q is an ordering extension of R we have τP (Q)τ which is impossible.
Therefore, R is S-consistent. The last conclusion completes the proof.
Remark 2 According to Theorem 3, m-consistency ensures the existence of a
reflexive and complete (tournament) extension of R and it has nothing to do
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with the existence of transitivity. As we can see, the relation G of example 1
has as a complete extension, the relation
G∗ = G2
⋃
(
∞⋃
p=3
P (Gp)) = G2 ∪ P (G3) ∪ P (G4) =
{(x
1
, x
2
), (x
2
, x
3
), (x
3
, x
4
), (x
4
, x
3
), (x
4
, x
1
), (x
1
, x
5
), (x
1
, x
3
), (x
3
, x
1
), (x
2
, x
4
),
(x
4
, x
2
), (x
4
, x
5
), (x
3
, x
5
), (x
2
, x
5
).
This means that Theorem 3 guarantees a complete extension G∗ without
G being S-consistent.
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 3 for
Y = {x, y} and T = {(y, x)}.
Corollary 1 LetR be a Λ(m)-consistent binary relation onX ,m ∈ Ω
0
. Then,
for every pair (x, y) ∈ inc(R), x, y ∈ X , there exists an ordering extension Qxy
of R such that (x, y) ∈ Qxy.
By interchanging the roles of x and y (inc(R) is symmetric), Corollary 1
gives an analogous result.
Since transitivity implies Λ(m)-consistency, m ∈ Ω
0
, Arrow’s Lemma is an
immediate consequence of the sufficient part of Theorem 3 for m = 1.
Definition 2 For each m ∈ N, a Λ(m)-consistent binary relation R on X is
∆(m)-consistent if I(Rm) = ∆.
A consequence of Proposition 2 and Theorem 3 for m = ω is also the
Suzumura’s existence type extension theorem in [28, Page 5]. The following
corollary shows this fact.
Corollary 2 Let R be a binary relation on X , Y a subset of X such that, if
x 6= y and x, y ∈ Y , then (x, y) /∈ R, and T an ordering on Y . Then, there
exists an ordering extension Q of R such that Q/Y = T if and only if R is
S-consistent.
As a consequence of the proof of Theorem 3, the following result is also
true:
Corollary 3 Let R be a binary relation on X , m ∈ Ω
0
and Y a subset of X
such that, if x 6= y and x, y ∈ Y , then (x, y) /∈ R, and T a linear order on Y .
Then, there exists a linear order extension Q of R such that Q/Y = T if and
only if R is a ∆(m)-consistent.
Proof According to Proposition 1 and Theorem 3, there exists an ordering
extension Q of R such that P (R) ⊆ P (Rm) ⊆ P (Q) and Q/Y = T . Let ≈ be
the equivalence relation defined by
x ≈ y if and only if (x, y) ∈ I(Q).
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The quotient set by this equivalence relation ≈ will be denoted X
≈
= X
≈
, and
its elements (equivalence classes) by [x]. There exists on X a linear order Q
defined by:
(∀x, y ∈ X) (xQy ⇔ ∃x′, y′ ∈ X, x ∈ [x′], y ∈ [y′], [x′]Ry′)
An asymmetric, Λ(m)-consistent binary relation R
≈
is defined by:
∀[x], [y] ∈ X
≈
([x]R
≈
[y] ⇔ ∃x′ ∈ [x], ∃y′ ∈ [y], x′Ry′).
According to Corollary 4, there exists a strict linear order extension Q˜≈ of
R
≈
. Therefore, as in the proof of Theorem 1 [20, Pages 399-400], by using a
subbase of τ , we construct a strict linear order extension R∗ of R such that
for each y ∈ X the set {x ∈ X |xR∗y} belongs to τ .
We prove that (x, y) ∈ I(Rm) = ∆, which implies that Q is antisymmetric
and thus it is a linear order. Suppose to the contrary that (x, y) /∈ I(R) =
I(Rm). Then, since (x, y) ∈ P (Rm) ⊆ P (Q) and (y, x) ∈ P (Rm) ⊆ P (Q) is
impossible, we conclude that (x, y) /∈ Rm and (y, x) /∈ Rm.
But then, x, y ∈ Y and (x, y) ∈ T or (y, x) ∈ T which implies that xP (Q)y
or yP (Q)x which is impossible. The last contradiction shows that Q is a linear
extension of R.
Conversely, if there exists a linear order extension Q of R, then by Theorem
3, R is Λ(ω)-consistent. It remains to show that I(R) = ∆. Suppose to the
contrary that I(R) 6= ∆. This implies that, there exist x, y ∈ X , x 6= y, such
that
(x, y) ∈ I(R) ⊆ I(Q) and (x, y) 6∈ ∆
which contradicts the anti-symmetry of Q.
If R is a partial order, Corolarry 3 implies one of the main results of [19,
Theorem 2.2].
As a corollary to Theorem 3, we also obtain the following well known
inherited type extension theorem of Szpilrajn [30].
Corollary 4 Every (strict) partial order R possesses a (strict) linear order
extension Q. Moreover, if x and y are any two non-comparable elements of
R, then there exists a (strict) linear order extension Q′ in which xQ′y and a
(strict) linear order extension Q′′ in which yQ′′x.
Proof It is an immediate result of Theorem 3 for Y = {x, y}, T = {(x, y)},
m = 1 and R being (asymmetric and transitive) reflexive, transitive and anti-
symmetric.
Since transitivity implies Λ(m)-consistency for al m ∈ Ω
0
, the following
corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 3.
Corollary 5 (Hanson [17] and Fishburn [14]). Every quasi-ordering has an
ordering extension.
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4 Refinements of Szpilrajn’s type theorems
In this paragraph, we give a general Dushnik-Miller inherited type extension
theorem in which all the well known Dushnik-Miller extension theorems are
obtained as special cases.
Theorem 4 Let R be a binary relation on X . Then, R has as realizer the
set of ordering extensions of R if and only if R is Λ(m)-consistent for some
m ∈ Ω
0
.
Proof To prove necessity, let R be a Λ(m)-consistent binary relation on X for
some m ∈ Ω
0
and let Q be the set of all order extensions of R. By Theorem
3, Q is non-empty. We show that R =
⋂
Q∈Q
Q. Indeed, since R ⊆
⋂
Q∈Q
Q, we
have to show that
⋂
Q∈Q
Q ⊆ R. Suppose to the contrary that there exists an
(x, y) ∈
⋂
Q∈Q
Q with (x, y) /∈ R. We first prove that (y, x) /∈ R. Suppose to
the contrary that (y, x) ∈ R. Since (y, x) ∈ P (R) ⊆ P (Q) contradicts the fact
that (x, y) ∈ Q, we conclude that (y, x) /∈ R. Define
R′ = R ∪ {(y, x)}.
Clearly, R ⊂ R′ ⊆ R. We also have P (R) ⊂ P (R′) ⊆ P (R). To prove the
second inclusion suppose to the contrary that (κ, λ) ∈ P (R′) and (κ, λ) /∈
P (R). It follows that (λ, κ) ∈ R. If (κ, λ) = (y, x), then (x, y) ∈ R which is
impossible. If (κ, λ) ∈ P (R′) \ {(y, x)} = P (R), then (κ, λ) ∈ I(R) = I(Rm) a
contradiction to (κ, λ) ∈ P (R) and (λ, κ) ∈ Rm. Therefore, P (R) ⊂ P (R′) ⊆
P (R). If R is complete then R ∈ Q. But then, (y, x) ∈ P (R) implies that
(x, y) /∈
⋂
Q∈Q
Q, a contradiction). Thus, R is incomplete. Let T be the set of
transitive extensions of R. Since R ∈ T , this set is non-empty. Then, as in the
proof of Theorem 1,there exists a maximal element T̂ of T . We prove that T̂
is complete. Suppose to the contrary that (x∗, y∗) /∈ T̂ and (y∗, x∗) /∈ T̂ for
some x∗, y∗ ∈ X . Then, it is easy to check that the relation
T˜ = T̂ ∪ {(κ, λ)|κT̂ y∗ and x∗T̂ λ}
is transitive, a contradiction to the maximal character of T̂ . Therefore, T̂ ∈ Q.
Since (y, x) ∈ P (R) ⊆ P (T̂ ) we have (x, y) /∈ T̂ , again a contradiction to
(x, y) ∈
⋂
Q∈Q
Q. Therefore, in any case we have (y, x) /∈ R. We now prove
that (x, y) /∈ R jointly to (y, x) /∈ R leads again to a contradiction, and thus,⋂
Q∈Q
Q ⊆ R. Indeed, let
S = R ∪ {(κ, λ)|κRy and xRλ}.
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Then, since R is Λ(m)-consistent, as in the proof of Theorem 1, there exists an
ordering extension Ŝ of R such that P (R) ⊆ P (S) ⊆ P (Ŝ). Since (y, x) ∈ P (S)
((x, x) ∈ R, (y, y) ∈ R, (x, y) /∈ R and (y, x) 6∈ R) we have that (x, y) /∈ Ŝ, a
contradiction to (x, y) ∈
⋂
Q∈Q
Q. This contradiction confirms that
⋂
Q∈Q
Q ⊆ R.
To finish the proof of necesity, it remains to show that Q is a realizer. But,
this is an immediate consequence of the Corollary 1.
To prove sufficiency, suppose that R has as realizer the set of all order
extensions of R, let Q. We prove that R is Λ(ω)-consistent. Indeed, since⋂
Q∈Q
Q = R we have P (R) ⊆
⋂
Q∈Q
P (Q) ⊆ P (
⋂
Q∈Q
Q) = P (R) = P (Rω).
Therefore, R is Λ(ω)-consistent. The last conclusion completes the proof.
Theorems 3 and 6 and remark 2 imply the following corollary.
Corollary 6 Let R be a binary relation on X . Then, Rm has as realizer the
set of reflexive and complete (tournament) extensions of R if and only if R is
m-consistent for some m ∈ Ω
0
.
The following result is an immediate consequence of Corollary 3.
Corollary 7 Let R be a binary relation on X and let m ∈ Ω
0
. Then, R has
as realizer the set of linear order extensions of R if and only if R is ∆(m)-
consistent.
The following corollary is an irreflexive variant of Corollary 7.
Corollary 8 Let R be a binary relation on X and let m ∈ Ω
0
. Then, R has
as realizer the set of strict linear order extensions of R if and only if R is
asymmetric and Λ(m)-consistent.
Proof Suppose that R is an asymmetric and Λ(m)-consistent binary relation
for some m ∈ Ω
0
. Then, R∪∆ is ∆(m)-consistent. Let Q be the class of linear
order extensions of R. Then, R ∪∆ =
⋂
Q∈Q
Q. It follows that R =
⋂
Q∈Q
Q \∆,
where Q \∆ is a strict linear order extension of R. Conversely, suppose that
R is the intersection of all strict linear order extensions of R. Then, R is
Λ(ω)-consistent and asymmetric since I(R) ⊆ I(R) ⊆ I(Q) = ∅.
Next is a result due to Dushnik and Miller [13, Theorem 2.32].
Corollary 9 If R is any (strict) partial order on a set X , then there exists a
collection Q of (strict) linear orders on X which realize R.
Proof This follows immediately from Theorem 6, by letting R to be (strict)
partial order.
The next result, proved by Donaldson and Weymark [11], strengthens Fish-
burn’s Lemma 15.4 in [14] and Suzumura’s Theorem A(4) in [29].
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Corollary 10 Every quasi-ordering is the intersection of a collection of or-
derings.
Proof It is an immediate consequence of the sufficiency part of Theorem 6, by
letting m = 1.
Definition 3 [12, Definition 6]. Given relations R and R′, R′ is a compatible
extension of R if R ⊆ R′ and P (R) ⊆ P (R′).
In what follows, R denotes the class of binary relations which are compatible
extensions of R.
We recall the following definitions from [12].
Definition 4 The class R is closed upward if, for all chains C in R,
⋃
{R′|R′ ∈ C} ∈ R.
Definition 5 The class R is arc-receptive if, for all distinct s and t and for
all transitive R′ ∈ R, (t, s) /∈ R′ implies R ∪ {(s, t)} ∈ R.
Proposition 3 Assume R is closed upward and arc-receptive. If R is Λ(m)-
consistent for some m ∈ Ω
0
and R ∈ R, then
R =
⋂
{R′ ∈ R|R′ is a complete, transitive extension of R}.
Proof To prove the corollary, let m ∈ N and R be a Λ(m)-consistent binary
relation such that R ∈ R. It follows from Theorem 6 that,
R =
⋂
{R′ |R′ is a complete, transitive extension of R}.
It remains to prove that R′ ∈ R. Because R ⊆ R′ by transitivity of R′, we
obtain R ⊆ R′. If R′ = R, then R′ ∈ R. Otherwise, suppose that R ⊂ R′. We
first show that there exists a transitive extension of R, let Q, such that Q ∈ R
and R ⊂ Q ⊆ R′. Indeed, assume that s, t ∈ X are such that (s, t) ∈ R′ \ R.
There are two cases to consider: (i) (t, s) ∈ R′; (ii) (t, s) /∈ R′.
Case (i). (t, s) ∈ R′. In this case, since R is arc-receptive, R ∈ R and (s, t) /∈ R
we conclude that Q = R ∪ {(t, s)} ∈ R. We now prove that Q is a transitive
extension of R. Since Q is transitive, it suffices to show that Q is an extension
of R. Clearly, R ⊂ Q. To verify that P (R) ⊂ P (Q), take any (p, q) ∈ P (R)
and suppose (p, q) /∈ P (Q).
Since (p, q) ∈ R ⊂ R ∪ {(t, s)}, this means that (q, p) ∈ R ∪ {(t, s)}. Hence,
there exists z
0
, z
1
, z
2
, ..., z
m
∈ X such that
q = z
0
{R ∪ {(t, s)}}z
1
{R ∪ {(t, s)}}z
2
...{R ∪ {(t, s)}}z
m
= p.
Thus, there exists at least one k ∈ {0, 1, ...,m−1} such that (z
k
, z
k+1
) = (t, s),
for otherwise (q, p) ∈ R, a contradiction. Let z
λ
be the first occurrence of t
and let z
µ
the last occurrence of s. Then, since (p, q) ∈ P (R) ⊆ R,
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s = z
µ
Rz
µ+1
...Rz
m
= pRqRz
0
...Rz
λ
= t.
Hence, (s, t) ∈ R, a contradiction. Since R′ is transitive, R ⊂ Q ⊆ R′.
Case (ii). (t, s) /∈ R′. In this case, we must have (t, s) /∈ R, since otherwise, we
must have (t, s) ∈ R′, a contradiction.
Let Q = R ∪ {(s, t)}. Then, as in the case (i), we obtain Q ∈ R and R ⊂
Q ⊆ R′. Let Q̂ = (Q̂i)i∈I be the set of transitive extensions of R such that
R ⊂ Q̂
i
⊆ R′ and Q̂
i
∈ R. Let C be a chain in Q̂, and Ĉ =
⋃
C. Clearly,
R ⊂ Ĉ ⊆ R′. Since R is closed upward, Ĉ ∈ R. Therefore, by Zorn’s lemma,
Q̂ has an element, say Q˜, that is maximal with respect to set inclusion. Then,
R′ = Q˜ ∈ R. Otherwise, there exists (s, t) ∈ R′ \ Q˜ such that Q′ = Q˜ ∪ {(s, t)}
or Q′ = Q˜ ∪ {(t, s)} is a transitive extension of R satisfying Rm ⊂ Q˜ ⊂ Q′ ⊆
R′, which is impossible by maximality of Q˜. This completes the proof.
Since S-consistency is equivalent to Λ(ω)-consistency, the following result
is an immediate corollary of the previous proposition.
Corollary 11 (Duggan’s General Extension Theorem [12]). AssumeR is closed
upward and arc-receptive. If R is S-consistent and R ∈ R, then
R =
⋂
{R′ ∈ R|R′ is a complete, transitive extension of R}.
Clearly, Theorem 6 concludes all the extension theorems referred to Duggan
[12, pp. 13-14].
5 Applications
Actually, it is well known that the notion of maximal element has interesting
applications to the study of economic and game theories. In fact, it plays a
central role in many economic models, including global maximum of a utility
function and Nash equilibrium of a noncooperative game or equilibrium of
an economy (Debreu [10]). We prove the following propositions as a general
application of the notion of inherited type extension theorems.
Proposition 4 Let R be a ∆(m)-consistent binary relation on some non-
empty set X , m ∈ N, and let x∗ be a maximal element of R in X . Then, there
exists a linear order extension Q of R such that x∗ is a maximal element of Q
in X .
Proof We first show that x∗ is a maximal element of R. Indeed, suppose to
the contrary that (y, x∗) ∈ P (R) for some y ∈ X . It then follows that there
exists l ∈ N and alternatives t
1
, t
2
, ..., t
l
such that yRt
1
...t
m−1
Rt
l
Rx∗. Since
(t
l
, x∗) /∈ P (R), we conclude that (t
l
, x∗) ∈ I(R) ⊆ I(Rm). Hence, because of
∆(m)-consistency, we conclude that t
m
= x∗. Similarly, (t
m−1
, x∗) ∈ R, and
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an induction argument based on this logic yields y = x∗, a contradiction to
(y, x∗) ∈ P (R). Hence, x∗ is a maximal element of R. If R is complete, then it
is a linear order extension of R which has x∗ as maximal element. Otherwise,
there are x, y ∈ X such that (x, y) /∈ R and (y, x) /∈ R. Clearly, one of x and
y is different from x∗. Let x 6= x∗. We define
R∗ = R ∪ {(κ, λ)|κRy, xRλ, (x, y) ∈ inc(R) x, y ∈ X, and x 6= x∗}.
Then, as in Theorem 3, we conclude that R∗ is a Λ(m)-consistent extension
of R. Since I((R∗)m) = I(Rm) = ∆, we conclude that R∗ is ∆(m)-consistent.
To show that x∗ is a maximal element of R∗, suppose to the contrary that
(κ, x∗) ∈ P (R∗) for some κ ∈ X . Since x∗ is a maximal element of R, we
conclude that κRy and xRx∗. It follows that (x, x∗) ∈ I(R) = I(Rm) = ∆,
a contradiction to x 6= x∗. Hence, x∗ is a maximal element of R∗. Suppose
that R˜ = {R˜i|i ∈ I} denote the set of ∆(m)-consistent extensions of R which
has x∗ as maximal element. Since R∗ ∈ R˜ we have that R˜ 6= ∅. Let Q =
(Q
i
)
i∈I be a chain in R˜, and let Q̂ =
⋃
i∈I
Q
i
. We show that Q̂ ∈ R˜. As in the
proof of Theorem 3, we conclude that Q̂ is a ∆(m)-consistent extension of R.
To verify that x∗ is a maximal element of Q̂, take any y ∈ X and suppose
(y, x∗) ∈ P (Q̂) = P (
⋃
i∈I
Q
i
). Clearly, y 6= x∗ and (y, x∗) ∈ Q
i
∗ for some i
∗
∈ I.
Since (x∗, y) /∈
⋃
i∈I
Q
i
we conclude that (x∗, y) /∈ Q
i
for each i ∈ I. Hence,
(y, x∗) ∈ P (Q
i
∗ ), a contradiction to Q
i
∗ ∈ R˜. Therefore, Q̂ ∈ R˜. By Zorn’s
lemma R˜ possesses an element, say Q, that is maximal with respect to set
inclusion. Therefore, as above we can prove that Q is an extension of R which
has x∗ as maximal element. We prove that Q is complete. Indeed, take any
x, y ∈ X such that (x, y) /∈ Q and (y, x) /∈ Q. We define
Q∗ = Q ∪ {(κ, λ)|κQy, xQλ, (x, y) /∈ Q, (y, x) /∈ Q and x 6= x∗}.
Then, as in case of R∗ above, we have that Q∗ is a ∆(m)-consistent binary
relation which has x∗ as maximal element, a contradiction to the maximality
of Q. The last contradiction implies that Q is complete.
As a corollary of the previous result we have a generalization of Sophie
Bade’s result in [2, Theorem 1](she uses transitive binary relations) which
shows that the set of Nash equilibria of any game4 with incomplete prefer-
ences can be characterized in terms of certain derived games with complete
preferences. More general, it is shown a similarity between the theory of games
with incomplete preferences and the existing theory of games with complete
preferences. I put in mind the following definition:
4 In this case, G = {(Ai , Ri )|i ∈ I} is an arbitrary (normal-form) game. Where I is a set
of players, player i’s nonempty action space is denoted by A
i
and R
i
is player i’s preference
relation on the outcome space A =
∏
i∈I
A
i
.
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Definition. We say that a game G′ = {(A
i
, R′
i
)|i ∈ I} is a completion of
a game G = {(A
i
, R
i
)|i ∈ I} if R′
i
is a complete extension of R
i
for each
i. In what follows, we denote the set of all Nash equilibria5 of a game G by
N(G). In the following theorem, each preference relation R
i
is assumed to be
∆(m)-consistent for some m ∈ N.
Corollary 12 Let G = {(A
i
, R
i
)|i ∈ I} be any game. Then
N(G) =
⋃
{N(G′)|G′ is a completion of G}.
Proof Clearly,
⋃
{N(G′)|G′ is a completion ofG} ⊆ N(G). Conversely, let a∗ ∈
N(G), that is, a∗ is a Nash equilibrium of G. Let us define B
i
= {(ai, a∗−i)|ai ∈
Ai} for all players i. Then, for any player i, a∗ is a maximal element of Ri in
Bi. By Proposition 4, there exists a completion R
′
i
of R
i
for each player i such
that a∗ is maximal point of R′
i
in Bi. Consequently a
∗ is a Nash equilibrium
of the completion G′ = {(A
i
, R′
i
)|i ∈ I}. Hence, N(G) ⊆
⋃
{N(G′)|G′ is a
completion of G}.
As we have pointed out in the introduction, we are often interested in
particular binary relations which have an ordering extension that satisfies some
additional conditions. The following proposition, which generalizes the main
result in [20], is an application to this specific case.
Proposition 5 Let (X, τ) be a topological space and m ∈ Ω
0
. If R is an
asymmetric, Λ(m)-consistent and upper semicontinuous binary relation on X ,
then R has an upper semicontinuous strict linear order extension.
Proof To begin with, we associate to R the equivalence relation ≈ defined by
x ≈ y if and only if (∀z ∈ X)[(zRx⇔ zRy) and (xRz ⇔ yRz)],
that is, x ≈ y if and only if x covers y and y covers x. The quotient set by this
equivalence relation ≈ will be denoted X
≈
= X
≈
, and its elements (equivalence
classes) by [x].
An asymmetric, Λ(m)-consistent binary relation R
≈
is defined by:
∀[x], [y] ∈ X
≈
([x]R
≈
[y] ⇔ ∃x′ ∈ [x], ∃y′ ∈ [y], x′Ry′).
According to Corollary 4, there exists a strict linear order extension Q˜≈ of
R
≈
. Therefore, as in the proof of Theorem 1 [20, Pages 399-400], by using a
subbase of τ , we construct a strict linear order extension R∗ of R such that
for each y ∈ X the set {x ∈ X |xR∗y} belongs to τ .
In direction of the inherited type Szpilrajn extension theorems, Demuynck
[8] give results for complete extensions satisfying various additional properties
such as convexity, homotheticity and monotonicity. Since Demuynck’s paper
5 An action profile a = (a
1
, ..., a
|I|
) is a Nash equilibrium if for no player i there exists an
action a′
i
∈ A
i
such that (a′
i
, a−i)Ri (ai , a−i ).
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generalizes S-consistency by replacing the transitive closure R of R with a
more general function F , I conjecture that these results can be extended to
the case of Λ(m)-consistent binary relation for all m ∈ Ω
0
.
The following proposition is given as a general application of the Dushnik-
Miller’s inherited type extension theorem.
For each x ∈ X , we define (see [25, Page 20]): i(x) = {y ∈ X |xRy},
d(x) = {y ∈ X |yRx} and Ix = i(x)∪ d(x). For any x ∈ X , xm and xM denote
the minimum and the maximum of Ix.
Definition 6 A binary relation R on X has finite decomposition incompa-
rability, if there exists n ∈ N and (x
µ
, y
µ
) ∈ inc(R), µ ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, such
that:
(1) (xmµ , y
M
µ ) /∈ R and (y
m
µ , x
M
µ ) /∈ R, and
(2) inc(R) = {(κ, λ) ∈ I
xµ
× I
yµ
|(κ, λ) ∈ inc(R), 1 ≤ µ ≤ n}.
Proposition 6 Letm ∈ Ω0 and let R be a continuous Λ(m)-consistent binary
relation on a topological space (X, τ) having finite decomposition incompara-
bility. Then, the dimension of R is finite.
Proof Without loss of generality, assume that R is reflexive. We first show
that for each x ∈ X the sets i(x) and d(x) are closed. To prove the case of
i(x), let z /∈ i(x). Then, (x, z) /∈ R ⊇ R. Then, by [25, Proposition 1], there
exists an open R-increasing neighbourhood Ox of x and an open R-decreasing
neighbourhood Oz of z such that Ox ∩ Oz = ∅. Since x ∈ Ox and Ox is R-
increasing we conclude that i(x) ⊆ Ox. It follows that z ∈ Oz ⊆ X \ i(x).
Therefore, i(x)is closed. Similarly, we prove that d(x) is closed which implies
that I
x
is closed as well. Hence, I
x
is compact. Then, I
x
has a maximum
element xM and a minimum element xm. To see this, note that if I
x
has no
largest element, then {I
x
\ d(z)|z ∈ I
x
} is an open cover of I
x
in subspace
topology with no finite subcover, and if I
x
has no smallest element, then {I
x
\
i(z)|z ∈ I
x
} is an open cover of Ix in subspace topology with no finite subcover.
Since R has finite decomposition incomparability, there exists n ∈ N and
(x
µ
, y
µ
) ∈ inc(R), µ ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, such that (xmµ , y
M
µ ) /∈ R and (y
m
µ , x
M
µ ) /∈ R,
and inc(R) = {(κ, λ) ∈ I
xµ
× I
yµ
|1 ≤ µ ≤ n}. On the other hand, by the
continuity of R we have (yMµ , x
m
µ ) /∈ R and (x
M
µ , y
m
µ ) /∈ R. It follows that
(xmµ , y
M
µ ), (y
m
µ , x
M
µ ) ∈ inc(R). We prove that dim(R) ≤ n. We define
Rµ = R ∪ {(κ, λ) ∈ X ×X |κRyMµ and x
m
µ Rλ}
and
RDµ = R ∪ {(λ, κ) ∈ X ×X |λRx
M
µ and y
m
µ Rκ}.
By Theorem 3, there exist linear order extensions Qµ and Q
D
µ of R such that
inc(R) ∩ (I
yµ
× I
xµ
) ⊆ Qµ and inc(R) ∩ (Ixµ × Iyµ ) ⊆ Q
D
µ .
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We prove that R =
n⋂
m=1
(Qm∩Q
D
m). Clearly, R ⊆
n⋂
m=1
(Qm∩Q
D
m). To prove
the converse, let (α, β) ∈
n⋂
m=1
(Qm ∩Q
D
m) and (α, β) /∈ R. The proof proceeds
in a similar way to Theorem 6, as follows: We first prove that (β, α) /∈ R and
by the finite decomposition incomparability property of R, there exists µ∗ ∈
{1, 2, ..., n} such that (α, β) ∈ I
x
µ∗
× I
y
µ∗
. Then, we prove that (α, β) /∈ Qµ∗ ,
a contradiction to (α, β) ∈
n⋂
m=1
(Qm ∩Q
D
m). The last conclusion completes the
proof.
Another example is the following: In the games that are compositions of m
individualist games6 (N, u
i
) (i = 1, ...,m) via unanimity, the usual description
of the game, by means of minimal winning coalitions, requires n
1
· ... · n
m
coalitions (with n
i
= |N
i
|) and if each one of them has m players, then,
m · n
1
· ... · n
m
digits are needed to describe the game. Using [16, Theorem
3.1],7(n + 1) · (m − p) (p < m) digits are required to describe the game.
This latter number is generally much smaller than the former, and so, the
description of the game is much shorter.
Many other interesting applications of the dimension of a binary relation
are obtained in Economics. For example, Ok [?, Proposition 1] shows that if
(X,≻) is a preordered set with X countable and dim(X,≻) < ∞, then ≻ is
representable by means of a real function u in such a way that x ≻ y if and
only if u(x) > u(y). From the multicriteria point of view, the classical crisp8
dimension refers to a minimal representation of crisp partial orders as the
intersection of linear orders, in the sense that each of one of these linear orders
is a possible underlying criterion. Brightwell and Scheinerman [6], on the basis
of Dushnik-Miller’s original theorem, prove that the fractional dimension9 of
6 If a game with player set N = {1, ..., n} admits a partition N
1
, ...,Nm in such a way
that
W = {S ⊆ N : |S ∩N
i
| ≥ 1, for all i = 1, ...,m}
we shall say that this game is a composition of m individualist games via unanimity.
7 Let (N,W) be a composition of m individualist games (Ni , ui) (i = 1, ...,m) with
1 ≤ n
1
≤ ... ≤ nm via unanimity and let p < m such that either np = 1, np+1 > 1 or p = 0
if n
1
> 1. Then the dimension of (N,W) is m− p.
8 Given a finite set of alternatives X = {x1, x2, ..., xn}, a crisp partial order set R ⊆ X×X
is characterized by a mapping
µ : X ×X −→ {0, 1}
being
(i) irreflexive: µ(xi, xi) = 0 ∀xi ∈ X,
(ii) antisymmetric: µ(xi, xj) = 1⇒ µ(xj , xi) = 0,
(iii) transitive: µ(xi, xj) = µ(xj , xk) = 1 ⇒ µ(xi, xk) = 1. It is therefore assumed that
µ(xi, xj) = 1 means that alternative xi is strictly better than xj (µ(xi, xj) = 0 otherwise).
9 Brightwell and Scheinerman [6] introduce the notion of fractional dimension of a poset
(X,≻). Let F = {L
1
, L
2
, ..., Lt} be a nonempty multiset of linear extensions of (X,≻). The
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a partially ordered set (X,≻) arises naturally when considering a particular
two-person game on (X,≻), e.t.c.
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